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Summary:
This paper contrasts the types of motivating questions, theories and
models, and theoretical explanations of phenomena in the economic and
psychological literatures on risk-bearing. An experimental methodology
for the verification of the economic theory of risk-bearing is developed,
and results of a pilot set of experiments using this methodology are pre-
sented. Tentative support for the risk consistency hypothesis of economic
theory is found.
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1. Introduction
It is instructive to constrast the approaches to the study of risk-
bearing decisions exhibited in the psychological and economic literatures.
This topic is of widespread interest and application in both disciplines,
and displays vividly the depth and breadth of stylistic differences be-
tween the disciplines. In this section, we will outline the types of
questions which appear to motivate the study of risk choices in the two
literatures.
The next section will contrast the economic theory of risk-bearing
with two alternatives proposed by Coombs [1975] and Kahnemann and Tversky
[1979]. The third section will mention the explanations these theories
provide for observed gambling and insurance behavior. The fourth section
will contrast the methodology exhibited in the psychological literature
with the methodology we propose, which is capable of economic interpre-
tation as verification (or rejection) of theory. We do not find this to
be true of the usual experimental methodology reported by psychologists.
As sections 1-4 indicate, research by psychologists in this area
has largely been comprised of attempts to refute and/or reconstruct con-
clusions and paradigms in the economic literature. Only recently have
economists based their research on developments in psychology.
To some extent, this trend continues in the following portion of
this paper, which reports on experiments we conducted as a prototype of
economic experimentation on risk-bearing. These experiments neither
support or contradict the experimental evidence proffered by psycholo-
gists. Rather we attempted to carry out the methodology outlined in
section 4, in order to bring economically interpretable experimental
evidence to bear upon the question of the validity and generalizability
of the economic theory of risk-bearing.
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The experimental procedures and design are reported at the end of
section 4, hypotheses and results are reported in section 5 and discussed
in section 6. Section 7 concludes, summarizes, and suggests extensions.
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We are naturally more familiar with the economic approach to these
problems than with psychological approaches. A serious attempt has been
made to discover the major beliefs and developments in the psychological
literature, and to present this approach fairly and constructively and
the motivations which the writings suggest underly it. We would appre-
ciate reference to any major papers overlooked and information on other
shortcomings of our characterization.
The shorter clauses "economists theorize," "psychologists believe"
and the like will be used frequently below. We emphasize, however, that
we do not know what it is that all economists or all psychologists be-
lieve, trust, or suspect. These references result from explicit state-
ments in the cited literature, or from inferences drawn from the liter-
ature: if the psychological literature contains many studies of a first
set of experimental issues, and we found no studies of a second set of
issues, then we infer that psychologists believed the first set to be
more important, interesting, tractable or interpretable than the second.
The two literatures quite clearly arise out of interests in sub-
stantially different underlying questions. Economists appear to be pri-
marily interested in questions of the following sorts:
1. Can we find specific, measurable attributes of basic indi-
vidual choices under risk that predict diversity in the
riskiness of asset holdings as behavior that can be sustained
3in the presence of feedback and replication?
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2. Will these attributes predict sustained diversity in choice
4
across insurance policies?
3. Is the aggregate pattern of risk allocation in capital and
insurance markets that is produced by such decentralized risk-
bearing choices sensible? That is, how extensive are the im-
provements, if any, that a social planner could make if risks
were borne in line with some feasible social assignment?
4. Can risk be specified as a function of the probability distri-
bution over outcomes in such a way that individuals whose
rational preferences over lotteries diverge can nonetheless
agree as to which lotteries are riskier?
Question 3 above is beyond the focus of this study, but should be kept
in mind, as it is the most basic motivation for most economic research
in this area.
In constrast, the basic questions which appear to underlie psychol-
ogists' studies are more introspective, and less concerned with inter-
personal comparison. It also seems to be the case that not all ques-
tions we list are concerns of all psychologists, or are even compatible
with other listed questions.
1. Is there some emotional involvement with risk that leads
individuals to prefer at least small amounts of risk to no
risk at all?
2. In evaluating risky alternatives, do individuals weight their
evaluations of the various possible outcomes under a given
alternative by the true or objective probabilities of those
outcomes (if known) , in order to attain a combined evaluation
of that alternative?
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3. Does the perceived point of reference matter for risk decisions?
4. Does whether individuals seek or avoid risk depend upon whether
the alternatives involve gains or losses?
2. Theoretical Approaches
2.1 Expected utility theory
The conventional economic theory of risky choice has little logical
variation from the economic theory of choice. Let C be a consumption set
(or set of alternatives), usually a subset of a finite-dimensional real
space. Let L be the set of measures or lotteries on C, where a typical
element of L specifies a probability with which any element c z C is
attained. L is convex, that is, for any x,y £ L, z = [Ax + (1 -A)yj*= L
for any A t£[0,l] .
An individual preference ordering is an order C on L x L, assumed
to satisfy:
Al. <T is complete; that is, for any x,y £ L, either x £ y or y <T x
(or both)
.
A2. For any x,y,z e L, the sets {AG[0,l]JAx + (1 - A)y C z} and
{a£[0,1] |z <T Ax + (1 - A)y} are closed.
A3. For any x,y,z 6 L so that x^y, — x+ — z^ — y+-rz, where
a ^ b means a < b and b < a.
Then, Herstein and Milnor [1953] demonstrate the existence of a real-
valued utility function v on L which is order-preserving, that is, for
any x,y e L, v(x) >_ v(y) is equivalent to x <T y, and which satisfies,
for any x,y £ L, any A e[0,l],
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v(Ax + (1 -A)y) = Av(x) + (1 - A)v(y). (1)
If B(w) C c is the set of gambles which are feasible with wealth
w, then utility as a function of wealth is the value function of the
concave programming problem which specifies rational behavior given
preferences:
u(w) = max v(x) subject to x £ B(w). (2)
The study of u(w) when v satisfies (1) originates with von Neumann and
Morgenstern [19A4], and u functions which satisfy (1) are traditionally
called von Neumann-Morgenstern (or vNM) utility functions.
Arrow [1965] and Pratt [1964] developed the relationship between
twice continuously differentiable, vNM utility functions and risk, aver-
sion, which they proposed to measure by
2 -1
„/,, „n _ -u" (w) = d u(w) ,du(wK mR(U
*
W)
" u'(w) : 2 ( dw } (3)
aw
R(u,w) is positive if and only if u is locally concave at w. R(u,*)
is everywhere positive if u is concave. For individuals a and b with
utility functions u and u,, if R(u ,•) >_ R(u, ,•) for all relevant
wealth levels, then u has in some sense "more curvature" than u. , and
a b
a will exhibit more risk aversion behavior than b.
The canonical insurance problem is when a and b achieve wealth
w + e, where e is a random variable. Insurance would guarantee a or b
wealth w + Ee - it, where it is the premium. The risk premium, it
,
the most
individual i is willing to pay for such complete insurance, is defined by
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E{u (w + e)} = u.(w + Ee - it.), i = a,b. (4)
Pratt demonstrates the following theorem.
Theorem (Pratt [1964]).
The following 3 conditions are equivalent.
(i) P.(u ,w) >_ R(u,,w) for all w.
(ii) There exists a monotone increasing concave function G such
that u (w) = G(u, (w)) for all w.
a d
(iii) For any w, any e, it » ir, , as defined in (4).
*.! "^ D
The second condition is that a's utility function can be obtained
by "concavifying" b's utility function. The last condition confirms
our intuition: a exhibits more risk averse behavior by being willing
to pay a higher risk premium than b.
The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion also coincides with intui-
tion in the canonical portfolio problem. If a and b face a choice be-
tween investing in a riskless asset yielding z or a risky asset return-
ing y (random), the optimal fractions of wealth invested in the risky
asset, a and a,
,
are determined by:
Eu.{a.y + (1 - a )z} >_ Eu.{ay + (1 - a)z}
for any ae[0,l], i = a,b (5)
For any y,z, for a ,a defined by (5), if R(u ,•) > R(u, , • ) , then3 b a d
a <_ a, . That is, a optimally invests a smaller fraction of wealth in
the risky asset than b; a's portfolio is less risky.
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If the behavior of diverse individuals is to be predicted in choices
over assets when no riskless asset is available, it is useful to examine
when a random variable Y is riskier than another random variable X.
Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970] list four plausible answers:
1. Y is equal to X plus noise: Y -\. (X + Z) where E(z|x) = 0,
all X (A^B means A is distributed as B).
2. Every risk averter prefers X to Y : if E(X) = E(Y) but
E{u(X)} >_ E{u(Y)} for all concave u, Y is riskier than X.
3. Y has more weights in the tails than X: if the density function
of Y can be obtained from the density function of X by a mean-
preserving spread of some probability mass toward the tails,
Y is riskier than X.
4. Y has a greater variance than X.
The 4th answer does not have the intuitive support of the first 3, but
is commonly used. Rothschild and Stiglitz show that the first 3 answers,
in fact, coincide, inducing equivalent partial orderings on random variables
taking bounded values. In terms of this common definition of increasing
risk, the variance approach, which is a complete order, orders cases where
X and Y are not comparable (neither a mean-preserving spread of the other).
In an addendum, Rothschild and Stiglitz [1972] report that their
equivalence theorem is implied by Blackwell's theorem [1950] (more acces-
sible in Blackwell and Girschick [1954], Ch. 12).
In the last two months, the first research on risk aversion when
initial wealth is uncertain has appeared, Ross [1979] and Kihlstrom, Romer
and Williams [1979]. This is important since complete insurance against
all possible variations in wealth is not available, and yet intuition
would lead to the suspicion that the more risk-averse individual would pay
a higher risk premium for partial insurance. Both of these papers, how-
ever, present examples where initial wealth is w (random), R(u ,•) ^.R(u,,*)
for all w, yet the insurance premia to avoid a risk e, unrelated to w,
exhibit tt (w,e) < ir, (w, e).
Ross proposes a stronger interpretation of "a is more risk averse than
b" to handle cases where wealth is random. He demonstrates the following
theorem:
Theorem [Ross, [1979]).
The following three conditions are equivalent.
(i) There exists a X > so that for all x,y:
u"(x) d 2u (w)/dw2
cl 3.
u"(x) ,2 t ... 2b d u, (w)/dw
b
u'(y) du (w)/dw
.. a _ a
— — u^(y) du
b
(w)/dw
w=x lw=y
(ii) There exists a monotone increasing concave function G and a
A > so that u (w) = Au, (w) + G(w) for all w.
(iii) For all w, all e so that E{e|w} =0, if it ,tt, are defined by
a b
E{u
a
(w + e)} = E{u (w - it )} and E{u, (w + e); = Edi^w - *h )},
then tt > tt,
.
a — b
Both (i) and (ii) express a condition that u is, roughly, uniformly
more concave than u, . Condition (iii) is that a is willing to pay more
for partial insurance, to avoid a risk that is uncorrelated with wealth.
—Aw —BwRoss presents the example u (w) = -e , u, (w) = -e , A > B, as a case
a b
where R(u ,w) = A > B = R(u, ,w), all w, yet (i) and (iii) above are not
satisfied.
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Kihlstrom, Romer and Williams [1979] deal with the smaller class of
cases where the insurable risk e is distributed independently of (not just
uncorrelated with) w. They show that if R(u ,w) >_R(u, ,w), all w, and
either side of this equation is nonincreasing in w, then it >_ ir. as defined
above (assuming e *• (e|w), that is, knowing the realization of w doesn't
alter distribution of e) . An example if presented to demonstrate that the
o
nonincreasingly-risk-averse condition is critical.
In Ross' model and in the Kihlstrom et al. model, the conditions
which imply tt >_ it are sufficient to demonstrate that a chooses a less
a b
risky portfolio than b, in the more realistic situation where there is no
risk free asset. For example, suppose there are two assets yielding random
rates of return x and y, where y *» {x + z + e}, z > is the added return
for investing in y, and £ is the additional risk. Assume
E{e|x + z} = 0.
In addition, for the Kihlstrom et al. context, e % (e|x + z}. Now if the
proportion of wealth invested in the riskier asset y is a ,ct, defined by
E{u (o y + (1 - a.)x)} >_ E{u i (ay + (1
- a)x)}, all ae[0,l], i = a,b
then a < a. in either model,
a — b
2.2 Portfolio theory
The psychological theories of decision under risk appear to have been
introduced as a direct consequence of dissatisfaction with expected utility
theory. Coombs [1975] develops an alternative he calls portfolio theory
(a terminological choice confusing to economists), clearly a culmination
of earlier work by him and others, referenced therein.
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Portfolio theory is defined directly on a set of gambles
a.
G = {A, B, C, ...} "with numerical probabilities and monetary outcomes,"
and takes as primitive concepts two binary relations on G, •£" and 2" .
<T is a preference relation, and <<" is a risk relation which is un-
P
'
r
specified; AC B implies that A is riskier than B for some measure of
risk. While Coombs does not specify, the context suggests to us that C"
is thought to be individual-specific, and <<T to be common across indi-
viduals. Also, rZ and <T must both be complete orders for the logical
operations Coombs performs to be valid.
Coombs structures (G, <. , - ) by assuming the existence of a
risk preference scale <J>(t,x), where t is an expectation level, and X6 G
with E(X) = t, satisfying:
i(t,A) > <j>(t,B).
1. Order preservation: If E(A) = E(B) = t, then AC B if
2. Single-peakedness: If E(C) = E(B) = E(A) = t and C £ B £ A,
then either <?(t,B)
_> <j)(t,A) or 4>(t,B) >_ <Kt,C) .
3. Dominance: If E(A) = a ^b = E(B) and <)»(a,A) _>$(b,B), then
a <~ B. Moreover, if either inequality is strict, B HT A.
P »p
In addition, Coombs assumes "risk invariance": If E(B) = E(A) and
K ^ Prob{K = k > 0} = 1, then 3 >" A if B + K^ A + K.
r r
Behavior then follows^"
. A is chosen over B if A £" B, and is
P P
chosen from the set S C G if A^ b for all B e S. In particular, if
P
E(B) = t for all B e S, A e S is chosen if <p(t,A) >_ <J)(t,B) , all B 6 S.
If choosing over alternatives with different means, Coombs theorizes
that an individual balances a tradeoff between mean and deviations from
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the ideal level of risk. Suppose, in addition, that, for any A,B with
E(A) = E(B), if k^T B, then A kr AA + (1 - X)B ^ B, for any X€[0,1].
Then if A is less risky than the individual would like, and B is more
risky than desired, for some X, AA + (1 - X)B <T A and XA + (1 - X)B/^ B,
which is not possible in expected utility theory. (Note that expected
utility maximization satisfies Coomb's theory.)
In postulating a complete risk order C , which is left unspecified,>
~r
Coombs is apparently relying upon Pollatsek and Tversky [1970], who set
out to develop a measure of risk based upon distributions of lotteries.
They provide axioms which imply the existence of an order-preserving risk
function, which under further assumptions is shown to be a linear combin-
ation of mean and variance (unique up to scale)
.
Pollatsek and Tversky present arguments for the plausibility of some
of their assumptions, but not for the assumption that there is a complete
order on the set of lotteries interpretable as increasing risk—this they
view to be innocuous. In light of the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz
[1970] and Blackwell [1950] discussed above, this assumption is so severe
as to raise the question of whether their theorem is vacuous. Coombs, of
course, also uses a complete order <T , and faces this same possible in-
consistency.
2.3 Prospect theory
Kahneman and Tversky [1979], which has just recently come to our
attention, is a presentation of experimental evidence which leads the
authors to reject the validity of expected utility theory, and of a
theory designed to be consistent with this evidence.
-12-
In prospect theory, the choice process consists of two phases: first
editing and then evaluation. A prospect (x..
, p • ..., x , p ) yields out-
come x. with probability p , and, for simplicity, with probability
n
(1 - Z p.) > 0.
i=l
The editing phase of the choice process is not precisely specified,
but described to include such activities as encoding prospects in terms of
gains and losses rather than final wealth, simplifying compound lotteries,
rounding off (x
,p ) = (101, .0993) to (100, .1), etc. Where the editing
phase creates inconsistencies, these are presumably of limited consequence.
The evaluation function for the edited prospect (x,p; y,q) is
ir(p)v(x) + TT(q)v(y), if a
V(x,p; y,q) =
v(y) + ti(p)[v(x) - v(y)], if b
where a is the case [p + q < 1 or x >_0 >_y, or x <_ <_ y] and b is the
case [p + q = 1 and either x>y>0orx<y<0]. If the weighting
function tt exhibited true probabilities (ir(p) = p, all p) , this would be
equivalent to maximizing expected utility with v as the utility function.
However, Kahneman and Tversky theorize that ir(p) = p occurs rarely.
ir(0) = 0, as "impossible events are ignored," and tt(1) = 1 by normaliza-
tion. However, ir(p) is a monotonic function flatter than f (p) = p, and
discontinuous at and 1. tt(p) + tr(l - p) < 1 for all pe (0,1), and ir(p) > p
for very small p. Above some rather small value, n(p) < p. Figure 1
shows a graph of ir(p). Finally, ir(p) is flatter near 0: if
tt(p)v(x) = Tr(pq)v(y), then ^^- <
ff
ft"^ , < p,q,r < 1. That is,tap) — T(.pr) —
relative to given odds of obtaining x, if a more favorable outcome y is
-13*.
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just enough less probable to create indifference, proportionate reductions
in odds destroys this indifference, leading one to favor the smaller chance
of a greater return.
Kahneman and Tversky further believe that v does not behave like
a concave utility function, v is defined for gains and losses from an
initial reference point, is concave for gains, convex for losses, and
steeper for losses than for gains.
Thus, choices diverge from expected utility maximizing choices in
the underweighting of all but very small probabilities (and certainty),
and in risk-seeking for losses.
In transactions where one pays money for a desirable prospect,
Kahneman and Tversky hypothesize that the prospect and its cost are
evaluated separately. That is, if the prospect (1000, .01) were avail-
able for a cost of 10, rather than contrasting (990, .01, -10, .99) to
(0), the individual contrasts (1000, .01) to (-10). This makes the
prospect less attractive, given their theory.
The following quote vividly illustrates the contrast of their theory
with the economic approach:
. . . we are compelled to assume that values are attached to
changes rather than to final states, and that decision weights
do not coincide with stated probabilities. These departures
from expected utility theory must lead to normatively unaccep-
table consequences, such as inconsistencies, intransitivities,
and violations of dominance. Such anomalies of preference are
normally corrected by the decision maker when he realizes that
his preferences are inconsistent, intransitive, or inadmissible.
In many situations, however, the decision maker does not have
the opportunity to discover that his preferences could violate
decision rules that he wishes to obey. In these circumstances .
the anomalies implied by prospect theory are predicted to occur.
3. Explanations of Behavior
The coexistence of gambling and insurance is widely regarded as a
key paradox for a theory of risk choice to explain. Portfolio theory
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explains gambling by suggsting that the gambler prefers some risk to
none at all, and is willing to sacrifice expected value to obtain some
risk. It has some difficulty explaining insurance, for not buying
insurance would also give the individual some risk. The theory is
forced to suggest that not buying insurance would leave the person with
more than the ideal risk, but placing amounts roughly comparable to
insurance premiums on low-probability, high-payout gambles would be in-
consistent with buying insurance. Portfolio theory is more comfortable
with the person who buys insurance only against major (low-probability)
catastrophes, and bets $1 on a rr chance to win $2.80.
Prospect theory has some difficulty with both insurance and gambling.
Gambling is modelled as involving low-probability gains, over which people
are risk-averse. Insurance involves avoiding low-probability losses, but
people are risk seekers when it comes to losses. And the gambling wins
or insurable hazards are evaluated separately from the ante or premium,
which gets overweighted because it is certain.
Thus, propsect theory must rely upon overweighting of very small
probabilities to overcome what would otherwise be a strong prediction
that gambling and insurance would be unchosen alternatives. In parti-
cular, this theory is more comfortable with insurance only against very
low probability events, and such gambling as state lottery tickets, or
betting on horses who seldom win.
The expected utility explanation of gambling and insurance is less
strained in elucidating diversity of gambling and insurance choices
across people. Insurance against any variation e, low probability or
not, available for cost c is purchased if ir(e,w) >_ c, if this risk premium
the individual is willing to pay exceeds the cost. More risk averse
-16-
people will be seen insuring against less risky contingencies, and insur-
ance against major wealth changes will sell to a wider market.
There seems to be a common conception among psychologists that
gambling is inconsistent with expected utility maximization. We consider
this a misconstrual of the theory. Recall that utility is a function of
consumption lotteries, derived from preferences over probability measures
on the consumption set. Utility of wealth is defined as the utility of
the utility-maximal consumption vector obtainable with that level of
wealth.
Gambling is not an investment activity for the representative con-
sumer who gambles, but a consumption activity, like eating a mango,
riding in a speedboat, or employing the services of a prostitute. The
consumer gambles because the combination of attributes so consumed— the
risk involved, the personalities and interaction, the attention he re-
ceives, the physical setting, and the emotional impact of all these
factors—is preferred to alternative consumption possibilities.
It is true that good or poor luck in gambling will affect the amount
of resources which the gambler can devote to other consumption activities.
But this is also the case when an individual does not know how many
stores he will have to visit to obtain an item with a known price but
unknown availability. Visiting stores in such a case is not a contra-
diction to expected utility maximization.
Gambling would only be a contradiction of expected utility maxi-
mization if all the valued consumption attributes were available in some
alternative risk-free consumption activity. Since some of these con-
sumption attributes depend upon risk to be enjoyable for the individual,
12this is not a conceivably available alternative.
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4. Methodology
4.1 Hypothetical choices
The prevalent methodology in psychological studies of decision under
risk is well-known. Subjects in experiments are in effect surveyed,
asked to divulge the hypothetical choices they would make if actually
faced with a specified choice problem, presented in questionnaire form.
In some cases subjects are asked to make choices from up to 120
pairs or triples of alternatives. Kahneman and Tversky [1979] reduced
or eliminated fatigue effects by limiting the number of choices made
to 12.
They support this methodology as being preferable to feasible
alternatives:
The reliance on hypothetical choices raises obvious
questions regarding the validity of the method and the gen-
eralizability of the results. We are keenly aware of these
problems. However, all other methods that have been used to
test utility theory also suffer from severe drawbacks. Real
choices can be investigated either in the field, by natur-
alistic or statistical observations of economic behavior, or
in the laboratory. Field studies can only provide for rather
crude tests of qualitative predictions, because probabilities
and utilities cannot be adequately measured in such contexts.
Laboratory experiments have been designed to obtain precise
measures of utility and probability from actual choices, but
these experimental studies typically involve contrived gambles
for small stakes, and a large number of repetitions of very
similar problems. These features of laboratory gambling com-
plicate the interpretation of the results and restrict their
generality.
By default, the method of hypothetical choices emerges
as the simplest procedure by which a large number of theoret-
ical questions can be investigated. The use of the method
relies on the assumption that people often know how they would
behave in actual situations of choice, and on the further
assumption that the subjects have no special reason to disguise
their true preferences. If people are reasonably accurate in
predicting their choices, the presence of common and system-
matic violations of expected utility theory in hypothetical. -
problems provides presumptive evidence against that theory.
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There are several reasons to be more skeptical of hypothetical
choices data than are Kahneman and Tversky.
1. In any choice situation complex or subtle enough to be worthy
of investigation, people do not automatically know how they
would behave since decision reaching is a matter of calcula-
tion, which is a costly activity. Subjects can be expected
to economize in their use of time and mental activity just
as with other scarce or valuable resources. When subjects
do not have adequate incentive to calculate a correct repre-
sentation of their behavior, it is hazardous to draw research
conclusions from their exhibited choices.
2. It is naive to believe that subjects have preferences over
behavioral choices (the reasons for experimenting), but do
not have preferences over reported choices to experimenters.
There are several reasons why a subject might report choice
A rather than choice B to an experimenter: a) the subject
actually would choose A in the situation being represented,
b) the subject chose A randomly, perhaps because random choice
was the result of a rational decision not to calculate a com-
14parison of A and B, c) the subject chose A because more money
was made with A than with B, d) the subject chose A because
(s)he derives enjoyment from actions thought to assist the
experimenter, and/or e) the subject reports choice A in order
to impress the experimenter with his/her intelligence, bold-
ness, or other ability or trait.
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In general, several of these reasons may be relevant,
and which are most important may determine the response.
3. When subjects are not motivated by payment in accordance with
their choices, experimenter effects may be an important factor
in their willingness to volunteer for the experiment originally,
Seldom does an individual volunteer for an unpaid choice experi-
ment out of a burning desire to reveal the truth, unless this
desire is closely connected to a desire to help out the experi-
menter with his research.
4. Without financial motivation, there is little scope for the
experimenter to alter the "terms of trade" among the various
reasons for subjects to choose one response over another. He
may alter the experiment so as to make calculating true re-
sponses require somewhat less exertion, but any significant
easing of calculations will sometimes interfere with what he
hopes to learn. Minor effects could result from making the
subject's task more interesting, and less repititious, but
again the investigation intended will leave little scope for
this.
While an experimenter can be careful to word instructions
in a neutral manner, and to avoid letting subjects discern
preexperimental hypotheses, without financial motivation,
desire to assist him will usually be the primary reason for
subjects volunteering. Thus, they may put more effort into
attempting to determine what response is most helpful than
into determining what response is most truthful.

-20-
5. Kahneman and Tversky's criticism of financial motivation ex-
periments is directed to experiments they have seen reported,
not to the potential of the technology. If contrived gambles
for small stakes will not reliably discern data, this is an
argument that scientific experimentation is expensive, not
that it is impossible.
A major advantage to an experimental methodology which pays or
rewards subjects in accordance with performance (by actually running
the lotteries they choose), is that the experimenter does have the
flexibility (at cost) to control other reasons why subjects may prefer
one response to another. If a given monetary difference (certain or
expected) between choices A or B is not enough to exceed costs of cal-
culation, revive interest, or outweigh a preference for bold actions,
the monetary difference can be increased. This is almost always possible
without interfering with the phenomena which the experimenter wishes to
observe or measure, and without introducing any untoward experimenter
effects. Careful research will usually be expensive.
There is substantial experimental evidence that significant vari-
ability in subject payments can dramatically influence results. These
considerations prevent us from concluding that economically valid im-
plications can be drawn from hypothetical choice experiments.
4.2 Froposed methodology.
This section outlines the methodology used in a pilot study per-
formed by the authors in March and April 1979. Extreme budgetary re-
strictions forced some compromises, and the novelty of the use of this
methodology to study these questions entailed learning on our part as
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the study progressed. Nonetheless, the report to follow indicates the
type of information obtainable and the degree of reliability involved
in reasonable stakes experiments, which we believe contrast quite
favorably with the hypothetical choices studies.
4.2.1 Wealth effects and variation
The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion cannot directly be observed
in the laboratory with currently feasible technology. Direct observation
that subject a is more risk averse than subject b in Ross' sense is be-
yond conceivable technology. However, the equivalence theorems of Pratt
and Ross provide a method of observation.
If subject a exhibits willingness to pay a higher risk premium than
b is willing to pay to avoid a wide enough variety of insurable risks,
at a wide enough variety of wealth levels, the theory allows us to con-
clude that a is more risk averse than b.
The theory then yields the testable implication that a, being more
risk averse than b, will select a less risky portfolio, in an investment
problem where cash rewards are in proportion to profits or losses.
It is, however, prohibitively expensive to substantially juggle
the wealth of subjects in order to determine risk premia at varying
wealth levels. It is also inconceivable with all but the most myopic
subjects, as subjects would quickly realize that the wealth level to
which the experimenter has boosted them is not the wealth level at which
' will end the experiment (another wealth level change is anticipated
soon as the subject exhibits risk tolerance at this wealth level),
and so the purpose would be defeated.
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As a result, the risk premium information obtained at a single
wealth level must suffice to discern risk aversion level, at least over
a wealth range sufficient to test the theory in a portfolio selection
simulation. The following precept enables single-wealth-level testing.
PRECEPT. An experimental subject facing risky choices evaluates possible
cash outcomes in terms of some utility function which can be approximated
over a relevant range by u(w,c) = -e - f(c), where k is an individual-
specific constant, w is final wealth, f is increasing, c represents
costs of calculating and information processing.
This supposes locally constant absolute risk aversion in the Arrow-
Pratt measure. Ross [1979] uses this case for his counterexample, show-
ing that there are risks e, uncorrelated with wealth w, which
exhibit the less risk averse individual willing to pay a higher risk
premium to avoid e. However, the theorem of Kihlstrom et al. [1979]
covers this case, so none of Ross' examples involve e independent of
w.
This does make it vital that the experimental design generate risks
truly independent of wealth. For example, particular abilities, skills,
or traits which may lead to higher or lower wealth should not spread or
contract the distribution of earnings in the experiment.
4.2.2 Experimental design and procedures
Five experimental sessions were run in Champaign, involving 18
subjects, at most four per session. We used the deductible on automo-
bile collision insurance as evidence of risk aversion. Consequently,
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subjects were recruited who had made their own decision on auto insur-
ance. Subjects were largely students, but four other occupations were
represented.
Sessions began by recording subject names and social security
numbers for files separated from experimental data. Subjects were
placed at tables about 10 feet apart in view of a blackboard, and did
not communicate with each other. Subjects filled out a chance bets
questionnaire and read instructions (both are in the appendix). Any
questions not dealing with strategy were answered.
As the appendix specifies, subjects were given a 3b-'week' price
history for seven stocks, labelled with Greek letters. They were to
manage a $10,000 portfolio to be invested in any or all of the stocks,
and to choose the amount of the portfolio to be 'saved,' earning 0.1%/
'week' with certainty. A 1% commission was charged on all stock trans-
actions. The portfolio could be reselected in each of the next five
weeks. Subjects would be paid $10 plus 1 1/2% of profits on the port-
folio plus earnings from whichever chance bet they chose in a pair
picked at random.
When instructions were clear, one of the authors sat down next to
each subject, to serve as an assistant for calculating and recordkeeping.
We were aware of the possibility that this would add obtrusion effects,
but felt that the effects of reducing boredom by handling calculations,
and of ensuring accurate records, outweighed any such problems. We
were careful to be neutral, and to avoid all expressions of approval,
surprise, etc.
When each week's purchases, sales and savings had been chosen by
the subject and recorded by the experimenter, the next week's prices
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were posted on the blackboard. After the final prices were posted, the
value of their portfolio and their 1 1/2% earnings were calculated.
Then the chance bet pair for each subject was chosen at random, which-
ever bet the subject had selected run, earnings calculated and paid in
cash. The collison insurance deductible was recorded (or value of car
if subject did not have collision insurance), and subjects were dis-
missed. The same stock prices were never reused.
5. Hypotheses and Results
The primary concern of our empirical work is with attempting to
predict the portfolio risk that people would assume in the experiment
outlined above. In particular, we wish to test whether subjects who
exhibit more risk aversion in their automobile insurance and chance bets
decisions will display the same risk aversion in portfolio choices.
Such a finding would be consistent with expected utility maximization.
Denial of this finding would weaken the foundations of asset pricing
theories based on the maximization of expected utility, where the utility
function incorporates underlying attitudes toward risk.
The theory of the earlier section seems to relate equally well to
predictions of chance bet outcomes, deductibles on auto insurance, and
risk of portfolios. Yet this paper concentrates on predicting port-
folio risk. Why, then is portfolio risk the focus here?
There are several answers to this question. First, the theory
developed above does not equally apply to all measures. While it has
been shown that a high risk premium for auto insurance and chance bets
implies a high level of absolute risk aversion which, in turn, implies
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a low risk portfolio, the reverse implication has not been proven.
Thus, there is some theoretical reason for using portfolio risk as a
dependent variable.
Furthermore, there are several more practical reasons for doing so.
For one, the majority of the risk in the economy is diversified through
19
capital markets; thus, the portfolio choices in these markets are
of primary importance. Furthermore, the portfolio choice in the exper-
iment seems to be much less subject to outside influence than the other
choices. Insurance choices are subject to moral hazard and information
assymetry problems which are not present in the experiment. The fact
that auto deductibles can not, in general, assume a continuous range of
values also presents measurement error problems. Chance bets provide
a weak measure of risk attitudes because of calculation costs and other
problems, as has been described above (and will be shown below). Thus,
portfolio choices, where subjects have access to the same information,
20
provide the "cleanest" measure of risk preference available.
Our hypothesis boils down to a statement that portfolio risk should
be positively related to the risk displayed in auto insurance and chance
bet decisions. Testing this hypothesis requires measures of risk for
the various decisions. The variable proxies to be used are the following:
PR - Portfolio risk is measured as the variance of return in a
subject's portfolio averaged over the six weeks of choices.
This is, thus, computed as
6 8
PR = Et E wT, o.
i=l
6
k-1 ik k
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where j is an index for weeks, k is an index for securities,
w., is the proportion of one's week j portfolio invested in
2 21
asset k, and a, is the variance of return on security k. ' No
covariance terms are needed here since all returns are inde-
22
pendent.
The use of this PR variable as opposed to the average standard deri-
vation or others, is motivated by a look at terminal wealth variance. In
this experiment, terminal wealth will be
W
T
= (1 + r
x
) (1 + r2 ) (1
+ r
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(1 + r
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where r. is rate of return in period i, W_ is original wealth. If the
r.'s are independent, var(r.) << 1, and o(r.) = 0, then
. W 6
Var(rp) = Z Var(r.)." J
i=l
These assumptions hold approximately here.
CB - The chance bets risk premium was measured as the minimum amount
of extra expected value necessary to induce a subject to take a
riskier bet. (The riskier bet here was a 60% chance of winning
$x and a 40% chance of losing $x-5. The less risky bet was a
80% chance of winning 5c and a 20% chance of losing 10c.) Where
a subject displayed inconsistent choices in chance bet selection,
the minimum amount of expected value he required to consistently
select the riskier bet was used. Only one subject displayed
such inconsistency.
DED - The deductible variable is measured as the deductible value on
the collision insurance of the subject's auto insurance policy.
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In the process of running the experiment, a problem with DED arose.
Three subjects had no collison insurance at all. The effective deductible
for these people is the value of their car, since this is the maximum
collision damage they can suffer. Thus, for people with no collision
insurance DED was set equal to their estimate of the value of their car.
The test of the hypothesis offered above was first attempted through
the following regression equation:
PR = b
Q
+ b CB + b
2
DED.
The linear functional form was attempted since it seemed the simplest,
and the theory offered little guidance in selecting a form. The results
of the regression run on the 18 observations in the sample (with t-
statistics in paretheses) is
(1) PR = 5. 04 - .374 CB + .00878 DED
(.89) (2.85)*
R = .35 F = 4.07*
The * is used throughout to designate significance at the 5% level,
** at the 1% level, and + at the 10% level in a 2-tailed test.
This particular specification was thought to capture the intended
effects imperfectly. Two specific problems remained. The less important
one involved the change of the price series used in the third run of the
experiment. That is, for the first 8 subjects, the price series had a
zero average rate of return i for the remaining 10 subjects, the series
had a mean rate of return of .2% per week. This change could possibly
have influenced subjects to take more risk.
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Th e more important problem involved measurement of auto insurance
risk. The implicit assumption in this paper is that the observed deduc-
tible represents the desired risk position of the individual, given the
premiums involved. This may not be true, especially for those with no
collision insurance. These "uninsured" subjects are likely not to have
desired the "full" risk of car value, but were unable to find offers of
any deductible in excess of $250. They were either forced to assume less
risk than desired ($250) or more risk (full value) . For this reason,
the "uninsured" subjects' deductible variable is measured with bias,
an upward bias in particular.
This bias suggested that equation (1) was not a correct specifi-
cation for the uninsured. They should show less risk than the regression
equation would predict. This lower risk could show up through differences
in either the constant term b
n
,
or the deductible coefficient b„. To
correct for this problem in this small sample, then, two variables were
looked at
.
IDUM - Zero for all those with collison insurance. One for
those without
.
DUMI - This is IDUM times the value of the car owned. It
will thus be the value of the car owned by the unin-
sured and zero otherwise.
If the influence of the bias is through the constant term, the coefficient
on DUMI should be negative. If the influence is through the DED coeffi-
cient, the coefficient on IDUM should be negative. The results of re-
gression using these new variables separately were
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(2) PR = 5.14 - 1.87 CB + .0165 DED - 12.2 IDUM
(.73) (3.40)** (1.95) +
R
2
= .49 F = 4.50*
(3) PR = 2.37 - .0356 CB + .0265 DED - .0168 DUMI
(.01) (1.94)+ (1.33)
R
2
= .42 F = 3.44*
An alternative method to get around this measurement problem is,
simply, to exclude all observations of those without collision insur-
ance. Since there were three such subjects, the sample size was reduced
to 15. Because these people were extreme observations in both the
deductible and portfolio risk, data, much of the variability in these
variables is removed by this exclusion. The result of a regression on
the 15 observations is
(4) PR = 3.47 + .0822 CB + .0216 DED
(.04) (1.90)+
R
2
= .24 f = 1.88
To correct for the price series return problem another dummy vari-
able was introduced:
PSER - Zero if a zero mean return price series was used. One if
a .2% weekly mean return was used.
The previous 4 regressions were rerun with the PSER dummy added. The
results were
(1') PR = 7.59 - 1.63 CB + .0102 DED - 4.49 PSER
(.60) (3.25)** (1.43)
R
2
= .43 F = 3.59*
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(2') PR = 6.97 - 2.57 CB + .0164 DED - 10.5 IDUM - 3.24 PSER
(.97) (3.40)** (1.64) (1.06)
R
2
= .53 f = 3.69*
(3') PR = 5.15 - 1.07 CB + .0215 DED - .0111 DUMI - 3.29 PSER
(.38) (1.45) (.78) (.93)
R
2
= .46 F = 2.77+
(4 1 ) PR = 5.77 - .831 CB + .0174 DED - 2.63 PSER
(.33) (1.43) (.96)
R
2
= .30 F = 1.55
6. Discussion of Results
The pre-experimental hypothesis tends to be supported, although not
conclusively, by the data. The primary predictions of the hypothesis
concern the coefficients of the CB and DED variables. The first should
be negative and the second should be positive. DED is consistently and
positively related to portfolio risk. The only equations where it is
not significant at the 10% level are (3') and (4'). In (3'), collinearity
with DUMI has clouded the results (notice that at the 10% level, no co-
efficient t is significant, but the F of the regression as a whole is
significant). The PSER variable also added to the collinearity. In
(4'), the reduction in observations and the exclusion of extreme values
has also contributed to the apparent insignificance. Considering the
overall paucity of data, the strength of the DED variable and its posi-
tive coefficient are extremely encouraging for the "consistent-risk-
aversion" hypothesis.
The CB variable, on the other hand, seems to have no relation to
portfolio risk. The conclusion we draw from this is that careful
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consideration of chance bets was not worth many subjects' cost of cal-
culation. The selection of chance bets seemed to be more strongly in-
fluenced by the subject's facility with expected value calculations
than by his risk aversion. Furthermore, the fun of betting (a consump-
tion activity) sometimes was overriding here, because of the small gains
and losses involved. These considerations would increase the noise in
the CB proxy for risk, preference, and thus reduce the significance of
the CB coefficient.
For an indication of how serious the cost of calculation problem
may have been, consider the specific bets offered. The average differ-
ence in expected value between the pairs of chance bets was 75c. Thus,
a risk neutral individual would gain 37 l/2c on average from calculating,
as opposed to randomly choosing chance bets. Since there were 12 chance
bets, of which only one was selected, this reduces to a 3.1c gain per
decision. If the cost of calculation exceeded 3.1c, a correct decision
would be too costly for this person. This does not seem to be an insur-
mountable sum, even with calculators available. This average gain
could also easily be dominated by other considerations like gambling
thrills.
It is also encouraging to find the added variable IDUM and DUMI
performing as expected with a negative sign. Since their signs are
something of a post-experimental hypothesis, or at least a during-the-
experiment hypothesis, we can not claim to have tested any hypothesis
here. Only new data can test such a hypothesis.
It is interesting to note that the IDUM coefficient seems to per-
form better than the DUMI. Thus, it appears that uninsured subjects
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risk preference differs from those insured mostly through an intercept
change rather than a slope change in the deductible coefficient. Again,
this presumption can only be tested with more data. Notice also, that
DUMI may be more troublesome in creating a greater degree of multi-
collinearity in the data. In fact, it is somewhat disturbing that a
respecification from DUMI to IDUM should make such a great difference
to the coefficients and their significance levels.
The PSER variable performs in a perverse manner in these regressions,
although it is never significant. That is, when expected return went up
on risky assets, portfolio risk was reduced. Our conclusion here is that
it was difficult for subjects to discern any difference in the mean return
of the price series, with such small differences and so much more involved.
It is likely that prior beliefs about differences between risky and non-
risky stock returns were far more important than the data here.
Overall, the results are encouraging. With so little data and so
many measurement problems, the relationship between deductibles and
portfolio risk is still highly significant. The fact that 30-50% of the
variance in portfolio risk is explained in these equations suggests that
risk aversion preferences exert a significant influence on portfolio
choice.
6.1 Further tests
Although not yet done in the present study, at least two other
interesting propositions could be tested with this data. One would
concern whether subjects would hold a mean-variance efficient risky
portfolio. In the return generation process used here, where all risky
security returns are independent and have the same mean, the fraction
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invested in any asset should be inversely proportional to its variance.
That is, for a mean-variance efficient portfolio, the fraction of one's
risky assets invested in security j should be
[Var(R )]
-1
x. = ^
j Z{[Var(R,)]
-1
}
k
where R. and R, are the returns on securities j and k respectively.
It would be interesting to see if subjects pick portfolios anywhere
close to efficient or converge toward this with stochastic feedback.
The efficient portfolio selection hypothesis could be tested against a
naive alternative hypothesis of some sort, perhaps that individuals
investment in securities is without regard to variance, and thus should
be on average equal across securities.
A second proposition would concern the influence of price histories
on expectations of future returns. The efficient markets literature would
suggest that price histories have no influence on future returns, and
certainly this is true of our generated data. However, several portfolio
(technical) analysts have suggested filter rules (buy a stock that rises
x%, sell it if it falls x%) as a way of "beating the market." A funda-
mental analyst, on the other hand, might suggest that a security has
a "true" value and the price will tend to revert to that value. Thus,
when the price is low, one should buy; when the price is high, one
should sell (here high and low are defined relative to true value)
.
The portfolio selections in the present study can be used to see
if either theory is implicitly followed by the subject. Do they use
filter rules and buy (sell) stocks that have recently risen (fallen)?
Or, do they buy (sell) stocks that have fallen (risen) in price, as
the mean reversion theory of the fundamentalists would prescribe? Or,
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as a third alternative, do they ignore past price history in selecting
stocks, as the efficient marketers would suggest? While this particular
test has not explicitly been done, a casual look at the data suggests
a mean reversion, "buy low, sell high" belief by subjects.
A general word of caution is necessary about applying the result
derived with experimental subjects to capital asset pricing problems.
The "price-makers" in the capital market learn the laws of economics
and probability through practical experience. Their costs of calcula-
tion are likely to be low. For this reason, they are apt to behave
differently, and probably more in accordance with theory, than randomly
selected subjects. Thus, a conclusion regarding pricing derived from
subject behavior in experiments is on somewhat shaky ground.
7. Suggested Extensions and Conclusions
The type of research done in this study has been interesting, but
also expensive. Aside from the subject payment costs, the researchers
themselves are forced to expend large amounts of time in the execution
of the experiment. Despite this, significant improvements to the study
could be made through increased expenditures on time and money.
The two key weaknesses of the research to date is the shortage of
data and the lack of wealth variation that could feasibly be studied.
The 18 observations in this study are obviously not a sufficient base
for any firm conclusions. In fact, it is remarkable that such a small
sample has provided as much information as we have found. More data
would not only provide stronger testing of the pre-experimental hypotheses
already investigated, but would enable the post-experimental hypotheses
to be tested on independent data.
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The study, additionally, was able to look at only small wealth
changes in the experimental setting. No subject earned more than $30
in the experiment overall, thus significant changes in wealth were
virtually impossible. Furthermore, since the law would not allow us to
take money away from subjects, no subject attitudes towards monetary
losses (in the Kahneman-Tversky sense) could be tested. With greatly
increased monetary payouts, attitudes toward risk could be ascertained
with less reliance upon the precept in section 4.2. Higher stakes would
provide more confidence that results are free from influence of extra-
neous factors like cost of calculations.
In particular, it is difficult to get localized information on risk
from auto insurance deductibles, since deductibles may only be available
in increments as large as $250. It would be quite useful if wealth
variations possible in the portfolio choices were of a comparable order
of magnitude to the deductible increments.
If we receive funding for further studies, we suspect the most cost-
effective way to data over signficant wealth variation is the following.
About 4 or 5 subjects are used in each trial. All are told in advance
that one of them will be chosen at random following the experiment. The
one chosen is paid in accordance with the high payment schedule, and all
others are paid a fixed sum. The high payment schedule is on the order
of $50 plus 10% of profits on a $10,000 portfolio. Presumably each sub-
ject evaluates risks of various portfolios in terms of the high payment
24
schedule, yet the cost associated with it occurs only once per session.
A wide variety of problems, other than those studied here, could
be examined in a framework similar to ours. An important extension
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could be made if individuals were given different information than that
given here, to look at information effects on portfolio decisions.
Summary statistics could be made more easily available to subjects to
reduce costs of calculation. Nonzero covariances between security
returns could be introduced to examine the influence of covariance on
portfolio selection.
Another class of problems that could be looked at is the portfolio
decision under asymmetric information. Such problems present tremendous
difficulties for tractable theoretical modelling, and experimental
evidence could direct theory. The circumstances under which equilibrium
with asymmetric information exists are not in general known. There do
not appear to be any tractability problems of a comparable magnitude
preventing experimental study of convergence, stability or price-
maintenance.
A few remarks by way of summation and conclusion:
1. We have contrasted and compared the economic and psychological
approaches to risk-bearing. We hope this has placed a clearer perspec-
tive on the extent of disagreement. Primarily, economists and psycholo-
gists come to these topics attempting to answer different types of ques-
tions. Much of the divergence in theories is natural given these sets
of questions.
Economists are primarily concerned with behavior which individuals
would continue to exhibit (or come to exhibit) if comparable circumstances
were repeatedly incurred. This presumably grows out of the pervasive
attention paid in economics to equilibrium concepts and phenomena. Econo-
mists recognize that behavior of individuals and of their socioeconomic
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systems will fluctuate following changes in underlying parameters, and
attempt to describe the effect of perturbations in terms of the situa-
tion which will result when these fluctuations have died down.
This is a perspective we have not seen in the psychological liter-
ature. Why not is a question requiring more knowledge of the history
of psychological thought and of the nature of the evolutionary process
in intellectual disciplines than we possess. It seems palatable, how-
ever, to draw the following conclusion: that the risk-bearing choices
of individuals may bear closer relation to the psychological theories
when this decision making is novel or unfamiliar to them, but they may
come to behave as predicted by the economic theory of risk aversion
with experience, feedback, and/or information. It is also more likely
that the decisions important to the aggregate pattern of risk-bearing
in the economy are made by experienced, rational agents.
2. We have pointed out problems and inconsistencies in the two
approaches when discovered. The predominant inconsistencies appear to
be in psychological theories, although both have some difficulty in
explaining all relevant phenomena.
A feature of the psychological literature which economists would
regard as a major shortcoming is the lack of interpersonal comparison
implications. Households and firms persist in exhibiting diversity in
risk-bearing, which economists attempt to explain and interpret. That
the psychological literature is exclusively introspective, and offers
no predictive explanations of diversity across individuals, serves to
reduce, we think, the extent of serious attention economists pay to
this literature.
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3. We have compared psychological and economic experimental tech-
niques. We have pointed out the methodological problems present in
experiments, and the way different experimental designs can circumvent
many of these problems.
4. We have reported the results of a set of experiments designed
to answer the question, "are risk preferences consistent, so that be-
havior of individuals in one risk choice context can yield predictors
of their risk-bearing decisions in other contexts?" Tentative support
for the risk-consistency hypothesis was found. While the experiments
were not designed to discriminate between psychological and economic
theories, the results are as expected utility maximization would pre-
dict.
5. We have suggested improvements to this set of experiments,
and directions for future economic research in this area.
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Footnotes
See, for example, Grether and Plott [1979].
We do not expect complete agreement from all economists on the way
that we have characterized the economic approach, or uniform enthusiasm
regarding the value and validity of experimental evidence. The economic
literature cited has a commonality of motivation and paradigm, however,
which is strong in comparison with either the psychological literature
cited, or the economic literature in such areas as macroeconomic policy.
Thus, we find justification for treating "the" economic approach as
unified.
3
Arrow [1965] and Pratt [1964], outlined below, are examples of con-
cern with this question.
4
See also Friedman and Savage [1948].
Arrow [1971] and an extensive literature deal with this important
topic.
For example, Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970], discussed below.
Clearly, a more risk averse person would pay less for insurance (or
pay more to avoid insurance) if e were negatively correlated with w.
Q
Note that the case where R(u ,w) = A > B = R(u, ,w), all w, is a
counterexample to Ross' theorem, but is covered by the theorem of Kihlstrom
et al. Thus, in this case, tt > i if £ is independent of w, but tt < it
for some uncorrelated, nonindependent e.
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9
The assumption that the set of lotteries is countable is never used
by Coombs. Modelling alternatives as countable is pervasive in the
psychological literature, and may stem from Pollatsek and Tversky [1970],
the most theoretical or mathematical paper we found regularly cited.
Pollatsek and Tversky employ an extensive system of measurement reduc-
tion to an order on the alternative set. As this is a mathematical tool
unfamiliar to us, it is not clear whether countability plays a critical
role.
Their words. Clearly, zero probability events and impossible events
are not the same. The uniform distribution on the unit interval ascribes
zero probability to every possible outcome. Kahneman and Tversky (like
all the psychological literature we have seen) restrict their attention
to choice over discrete probability measures, for reasons not apparent.
TCahneman and Tversky [1979], p. 277.
12
The psychological theories discussed might be able to explain gambling
in a similar way if they were developed, as expected utility maximization
is, from choices over consumption bundles.
13
Kahneman and Tversky [1979], p. 265.
14
It is incautious, we think, to conclude that subjects who don't bother
to calculate the truth will, in aggregate, display a response pattern
which is evenly distributed, that is, random with respect to choice pat-
terns of subjects who do calculate. Nor is randomizing order and location
a guarantee of random response patterns from unconcerned subjects. Un-
motivated subjects may disproportionately choose the alternative with
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the briefer description, or the one expressed using fewer numbers, or
may avoid choices with the number 13.
Fiorina and Plott [1975] report on an experiment where groups of 5
subjects were to choose via majority rule a point on a blackboard, from
(0,0) to (200,150). Preferences (and disagreements) were induced by
giving each subject a bliss or most preferred point, and informing each
of the dollar value earned should the group agree on that point, and
the rate at which earnings declined over concentric circles moving away
from the bliss point. Experiments were run under high payment and low
payment conditions. Both conditions paid subjects a reasonable wage.
In the high payment condition, earnings averaged $7.57 at the Majority
Rule Equilibrium, A, and subjects stood to lose amounts ranging from
$0.84 to $1.45 (averaging $1.19) per unit of distance if a departure
from A was not in their preferred direction. Results were clustered
tightly at A, which was predicted by several theories, with a (Euclidean
distance) standard deviation of 5.2 when full communication was allowed,
and 8.3 when communication was limited to motions and votes.
The low payment condition paid on average of $6.50 at A, gradient
amounts ranged from $0.01 to $0.05 (not $0.84 - $1.45). Now no theory
predicted the results, which were scattered about, with standard devia-
tions of 21.9 and 17.3 for full and limited communication.
The direct impetus for our development of this methodology and con-
duct of these experiments came from conversations with Julian Simon, and
discussions among the authors about Maital, Filer and Simon [1978],
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We limited suggestions to "if you tell me how many shares you are
considering, I can calculate the cost, or if you tell me how much you
want to invest in that stock, I can calculate the number of shares,"
and "have I recorded this correctly: you wish to buy 25 shares of
alpha, and sell 20 of delta ..." The frequent question after the first
week was answered with "You may change your portfolio or stay with the
same stocks, whatever you wish."
18
We are not aware of such a proof. We suspect it to be true that the
portfolio problem is isomorphic to the insurance problem. If this con-
jecture is true, credit goes to a private conversation with Stephen Ross.
If not, it was our conjecture which was false.
19
Much of the risk shifted to insurance companies is eventually trans-
ferred in capital markets, also.
20
The errors in the independent variables represent a problem, none-
theless. With two independent variables the error problem should be
attenuated, and heuristically more appealing than srious dependent
variable errors.
21
This variance is computed on the prior 36 weeks (it is not the
variance used to generate prices, as this was unknown to subjects).
22
The reason for summing over 8 instead of 7 securities is inclusion
of the risk-free asset (at zero variance).
2 3 9 2
Var(x,x 7 ) = x.. Var(x ) + x? Var(x-) + Var(x1 )Var(x„) , where
y = E(y) , when x. , x„ are independent.
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Minor technical improvements we would make would be two. One, a
substantial increase in the mean profitability of stocks relative to
initial commissions, evaluated over only a few 'weeks.' This could
either be done directly, or by eliminating or reducing commission
charges on 1st week purchases. Two, reduce the chance bets question-
naire to comparisons between a base bet and about 4 alternatives, and
multiply scale of bets noticeably. This will mean that the expected
gain from bothering to calculate which bet is chosen would be nonneg-
ligble.
M/D/230
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Thank you for agreeing to take pari, in an experimental stoclc-
irket research study. W e want to fine! out how people choose to
jy and sell stocks, using only information about the price movements
E the stocks. This experiment simulates a real buying and selling
ituation, and the prices are as predictable (or as unpredictable)
s on a real stock exchange. Of course, you do not use real money.
First, look at the Stock Price History sheet. It shows recent
information on the seven stocks which you can buy or sell. These
tocks were created so that none had stock splits, stock dividends,
ther unrevealed changes. Cash dividends are included in the price
tself, as if all dividends were' immediately reinvested, so that
ou can ignore price changes due to dividends being paid out. The
rices you see are closing prices for the given week.
o r
You manage- a portfolio initially worth .$10 , 000 . You may buy
ith any part of that sum that you wish, and. you can hole any pa
t in cash for as long as youlike. But you may not borrow mone
ry Lias . You will earn interest at 5 per cent per annum o~n any
alance. Credit for interest will be given week by week, though
ill not be calculated until after you have completed the experi
Interest on $10,000 over ten weeks of the experiment would be a
100). To simplify the bookkeeping there will be a flat 1 per c
barge on. each transaction for brokerage and taxes, no matter wh
ou buy or sell one share or a hundred.
s Lock
r t of
y a t
cash
i t
nvent .
bout
en t
e t h e r
You should keep a running record of your financial position on th
Current Fina n c 1a I Position sheet. Do your best to avoid error s i a
i r L t h :;i e t: i c. .
After you have had time to place your first orders for your
Purchases and sales on the Fur chase-Sale form for Week-Two, this
; o r m will be collected.
Then, closing prices
and you can consider your i
Purchase and sale orders on
ii n d hand the for ui i n .
for the next Friday will be shown to you,
nvestment position. Again, indicate your
the Purchase-Sale Order form for Week Two,
This process will be repeated for several weekly periods. Au the
end of the experiment, you can total up your assets in stocks and cash
and determine how well you did.
You will only be playing against the stock market, of course, and
none of you are affected by what anyone else does. Also, none of your
transactions can be big enough to affect the market price.
A't the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in
cash/ Your earnings will be equal to $10 plus I 1/2% of portfolio
profits (or $10 minus 1 1/2% of portfolio losses), adjusted for gams
i _ ._ _ i ' V ~ t-
or losses ivom die selected chanea bet.
CHANCE BETS QUESTIONNAIRE
Below you are shown pairs of chance bets chat vary in teres of the chances
of winning and losing, and the amounts of money that can be won or lost. For
each pair
,
please choose the bet that you would prefer to play. Indicate your
decision by making a check in the space provided under the bet you would prefer
to play. Consider each pair separately - do not let your decision in one case
influence your decision in another.
One of the pairs of chance bets will be chosen at random. Whichever bet
you chose from that pair will be run to provide an amount of gain or loss to be
added to or subtracted from your portfolio earnings.
x.
2,
60% to win $2.25
40% to lose $2.75
4.
6.
10.
11.
60% to win $3.50
40% to
to
lose
win
$1.50
60% $2.15
40% to lode $2.85
60% to win $1.50
40% to
to
lose
win
$3.50
60% $4.50
40% to lose $.50
60% to win $2.75
40% to
to
lose
win
$2.25
60% $2.00
40% to
to
lose
win
$3.00
60% $2.02
40% to
to
lose
win
$2.98
60% $3.00
40% to
to
lose
win
$2.00
60% $2.05
40% to lose $2.95
60% to win $4.00
40% to lose $1.00
60% to win $2.50
40% to lose $2.. 50
vs.
vs,
vs.
vs,
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs,
vs.
80% to win $.05
20% to lose $.10
80% to win $.05
20% to lose $.10
80% to win $.05
20% to lose $.10
80% to win $.05
20% to
to
lose
win
$.10
80% $.05
20% to lose $ . 10
80% to win $.05
20% to
to
lose
win
$.10
80% $.05
20% to lose $.10
30% to win $.05
20% to lose $.10
80% to win $.05
20% to lose $.10
80% to win $.05
20% to lose $.10
80% to wir $.05
20% to lose $.10
80% to win $.05
20% to lose $.10
Stock Price Histories for Prior 36 Weeks
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